highlight the large audit fee increases experienced by companies since the passage of SOX and related regulations show that arguments persist as to the cause. Regulatory impacts, increased litigation risk, audit scope, loss of non-audit fee work, internal control certifications, IFRS adoption, and changes in materiality thresholds are often cited to explain the fee increases (e.g., Stuart, 2002; Ciesielski and Weirich, 2006; Wilcox, 2007) . Most importantly, knowledge of why New Zealand audit fees might have increased should have high relevance to company boards and investors who pay for and, presumably, expect to garner the benefits of those services, such as a higher level of audit quality and assurance and better information for investment decisions educed by such increased fees.
Our empirical results are also salient more generally to discussions on accounting and auditing regulation that question the appropriateness for New Zealand investors of governance solutions developed for larger economies such as the United States or Australia. Some would contend that with increasingly global markets, New Zealand standards should reflect the increased risks and lessons learned from the overseas collapses, despite the apparent absence of any similar episode in New Zealand (Diplock, 2005) . Others counter-argue that a large-economy solution, if mandated, would be too burdensome for New Zealand investors, and endorse an approach that adopts only those international solutions that fit the local economy's interests (Hunt, 2005; Muriwai, 2005) . Evidence of higher audit fees in New Zealand soon after the passage of SOX would support the former view, whereas a finding that the higher audit fees align more closely with the adoption of local regulations and standards would be more consistent with the latter view.
Evidence on whether New Zealand audit fees and hence audit quality might have responded to international governance regulatory solutions should also be useful for standard setters in that any "optimal" level of accounting and auditing quality at the local level must necessarily consider the extent to which boards and auditors might have increased assurance voluntarily, or perhaps in anticipation of subsequent regulation.
Indeed, such evidence should be relevant not just for New Zealand standard setters but all those in smaller economies whose participants might be subject to U.S. or other larger economy solutions.
To examine how the different regulations might explain audit and non-audit fee changes over 2002-2007, we state an audit fee model and a non-audit fee model, and use temporal indicator variables to relate the timing of fee changes to the incidence of the overseas and local governance regulations. Since New Zealand permits the early adoption of IFRS, we are able to use event based indicators in calendar time to test the association between NZ IFRS adoption and auditors' fees.
We summarize our results as follows. After controlling for company size, complexity, and risk, we find (2003) provide one explanation of this decline. Unlike audit fees, we find no reliable evidence of a positive relation between the adoption of NZ IFRS and non-audit fees for New Zealand public companies.
. B a c k g r o u n d
Compared to its American and Australian counterparts, the initial response in New Zealand to strengthen corporate governance and audit quality was limited at best. Marshall (2002) committee with majority of independent director membership (listing rule 3.6), imposed a minimum quota for independent directors (listing rule 3.3)9 F 6 , and introduced the Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice as an appendix (listing rules, appendix 16). This best practice code, while not mandatory, recommended that 6 Listing rule 3.3 requires a company board to have a minimum of two independent directors, or one-third of the board, whichever is greater.
companies formulate a code of ethics (appendix 16.1), further addressed board and audit committee independence (appendix 16.2 and 16.3) , and required boards to monitor independence and all non-audit services undertaken by the auditor (appendix 16.4) . The code also required companies to disclose in their annual report the extent to which their governance processes materially differ from the principles in the code.
In addition, in February 2004, the New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC, 2004) promoted a set of nine corporate governance principles, which supported the general thrust of the NZX rules; however, the Commission imposed no requirement for companies to follow these principles. Despite the global initiatives for better governance and audit quality, few New Zealand listed companies were directly affected by SOX or similar overseas reforms; for example, few New Zealand companies dual-list on a U.S. exchange1 2F 9 , and New Zealand has no equivalent of section 404 of SOX (on internal control reporting).
As such, initial calls for such companies' boards and auditors to increase the quality of auditing assurance as
per SOX or similar solutions should have had only a limited impact on New Zealand audit effort and fees.
While company boards and auditors are free to set an appropriate level of assurance for their investors, our review of the New Zealand environment suggests a far greater preoccupation by such groups with the adoption and implementation of NZ IFRS than with SOX or CLERP 9. We would expect audit and non-audit fees over our study period of 2002 to 2007 to reflect this preoccupation.
. 2 P r i o r L i t e r a t u r e
Our study builds upon the literature of how regulation might affect audit and non-audit fees. Although such fee issues have been considered in contexts outside of New Zealand (e.g., Griffin and Lont (2007) and Salman and Carson (2008) 9 In our data sample, only Telecom Corporation of New Zealand was dual listed on a U.S stock exchange over the entire study period. Two other companies were delisted from a U.S. exchange (in 2002 and 2004). are the first of which we are aware to examine New Zealand audit fees in the post-SOX era.
Our study also relates to the literature on how auditor independence rules might change audit firms' fees from consulting services. For instance, if the provision of non-audit services threatens auditor independence and audit quality, then non-audit fees should decline following the adoption of stricter rules. Prior empirical evidence yields mixed results in this regard. For instance, some studies suggest that the provision of non-audit services increases the economic bond between the auditor and client, which leads to either actual or perceived impairment of independence (DeAngelo, 1981; Firth, 1997; Frankel et al., 2002; Kinney et al., 2004 However, the transition to and adoption of IFRS could also have an impact on audit and non-audit fees, and we need to incorporate this in our research design. Schadewitz and Vieru (2008) find that small and medium size listed companies in Finland paid higher auditors' fees, particularly non-audit fees, in their first year of IFRS adoption. A report by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales discloses that EU companies ranked increased auditing costs as one of the largest IFRS related costs (ICAEW, 2007) . That report also listed several types of support and services auditors may offer, suggesting a positive relation between permitted non-audit fees and IFRS adoption.
. 3 R e s e a r c h I s s u e s
Based on the foregoing discussion and literature review, we examine the following issues. Each builds upon the theoretical notion that to the extent that mandated accounting and auditing requirements change the optimal level of audit assurance, they should also change the optimal level of fees. We first predict that audit The paper continues as follows. Section 2 outlines the methods and data. Section 3 provides descriptive analyses of the level and the change of audit and non-audit fees, and discusses the results from regression analysis. Section 4 examines the robustness of the results to alternative procedures, and section 5 states the major findings and conclusions.
D a t a a n d M o d e l s

. 1 D a t a
We analyze annual audit fee, non-audit fee, and financial data for companies in the OSIRIS database with fiscal year ends from 2002 to 2007. Initially, we obtain a total of 724 company-year observations. To test better how the different regulations might affect audit and non-audit fee changes over our study period, we limit our analysis to companies with at least five years of data. Where necessary, we manually collect missing data from companies' annual reports. This yields a final sample of 653 company-year observations.
. M e t h o d
Our basic approach uses an audit fee model with fee determinants as per the prior literature and a series of temporal indicator variables to examine if the higher or lower audit fees correspond with key governance events that may have changed the auditing firm's environment.1 3F 10 To determine the potential effect of NZ IFRS on audit fees, we include indicator variables for the year immediately prior to IFRS adoption, the year of adoption, and subsequent years. We control for other fee determinants based on Simunic (1980) The prior literature guides our selection of the variables. In a review of 147 published studies, Hay et al. 10 Sub-section 2.3 states the models.
(2006a) report client size as the most important determinant of audit fees. That study also suggests that complexity of the client explains audit fees, as auditors must spend more time and effort in planning and coordinating a difficult audit. Audit fees associate positively with a number of risk variables. For example, Simunic (1980) suggests that client leverage, liquidity, and profitability are risk variables that drive audit fee increases, as highly levered, less liquid, and low return companies are more likely to incur losses.
Prior studies also show that Big N firms command a fee premium for reputation and quality (DeAngelo, 1981; Simon and Taylor, 1997; and Hay et al., 2006a) . In addition, companies in regulated industries such as finance are easier to audit (Turpen, 1990 ) and we, therefore, expect lower audit fees for these companies relative to those in other industries. Finally, audit report lag-the period from the balance date to the issuance date of the audit report-is often interpreted as an indicator for audit efficiency, as a longer delay can indicate problems during the course of the audit and difficulties in resolving sensitive audit issues (Knechel and Payne, 2001 ). We, therefore, expect a positive association between audit report lag and audit fees. We also expect a positive relation between dual-listing and audit fees as these companies often demand increased audit services and require the auditor to increase the scope and complexity of audit procedures (Carson and Fargher, 2007) .
We use log of total assets to proxy for client size (LTA), the ratio of inventory and receivables to assets to measure client complexity (INVAR), the ratio of long-term debt to assets (DA), the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets (ROA) and current ratio (CURRENT) to proxy for client risk, log of the number of days between the balance date and auditor signature date (LAG) to proxy for audit efficiency, a zero-one indicator variable for auditor quality (BIG4), a zero-one indicator variable for companies in the finance and investment services industry (FINANCE), and a zero-one indicator variable for dual-listed companies
We also include natural log of non-audit fees (LNAF) as prior research shows non-audit fees may be a determinant of audit fees.1 5F
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We contend that the auditors of NZ IFRS adopters will perform additional work to comply with the new 11 There are 13 dual-listed companies in our sample, all of which are (or have been) listed on the Australia stock exchange; and three of them are/have been listed on both the U.S. and Australia stock exchanges.
standards. The audit fees should be higher in the first year of adoption, when companies need to restate their opening balance sheet and provide prior year comparative figures, and also on an ongoing basis, reflecting the more onerous accounting, measurement, and disclosure requirements of IFRS. Audit fees should also be higher in the transition year (the year prior to NZ IFRS adoption) because of preparatory work related to the move to IFRS. We, therefore, include three IFRS related indicator variables, specifically, PREIFRS, IFRSY1
and IFRSY2&3 equal one for companies in the year prior to IFRS adoption, the year of adoption, and the second and third year of adoption, respectively, and zero otherwise. We also control for the effect of an auditor change (AUDCHG), as previous studies document audit fee differences by new auditors (Simon and Francis, 1988; Turpen, 1990; Pong and Whittington, 1994 (2001) argue that companies are more likely to engage an auditor viewed as a non-audit services specialist or industry leader to perform non-audit services. We, therefore, include a non-audit services industry leader variable (INDLEAD) in the non-audit fee model, and define INDLEAD equal to one if an audit firm is the largest supplier of non-audit services (based on total dollar fees) in the industry in which a company operates, and zero otherwise.1 6F 13 We expect the same signs for the common variables in the non-audit fee model, a positive coefficient for INDLEAD, and negative coefficients for the year indicators.
. 3 M o d e l s
We specify the following pooled cross-sectional regression models. For convenience, the models omit the time and company subscripts. Our audit fee model is:
Our non-audit fee model is:
where: share (based on dollar fees) in the industry in which a company operates. 13 We determine industry using the two-digit NAICS categories. Since the pooling of observations over time for the same companies can lower the power of the statistical tests because of lack of independence, we also examine alternatives to this approach and report the results in section 4 on robustness tests. 
R e s u l t s
. 1 D e s c r i p t i v e S t a t i s t i c s
. 2 U n i v a r i a t e R e s u l t s
This sub-section documents how companies' audit fees differ on the basis of selected factors. Specifically, we partition the sample based on median company size (LTA), company complexity (INVAR), company risk (DA), and non-audit fee (LNAF). We also partition based on IFRS adoption (IFRS), auditor change (AUDCHG), finance and investment services industry (FINANCE), audit firm type (BIG4), and dual listing (DUAL). Table 2 shows that mean and median log of audit fees are consistent with our expectations and differ reliably by our key factors. Audit fees are higher for clients that are larger (LTA), more complex (INVAR), and more risky (DA). Audit fees are also higher when clients buy more non-audit services, when clients adopt IFRS early, when a company chooses a Big 4 firm as its audit provider, and when a company lists on an overseas exchange. We also observe lower audit fees for companies in the finance and investment services industry (FINANCE) and companies with auditor changes (AUDCHG), although the differences are not significant. 18 A correlation matrix for the audit fee model shows that none of the correlation coefficients is greater than a threshold of 0.500. The correlation matrix for the non-audit fee model reveals that LAF is positively associated with LTA (the coefficient is 0.793), and no other correlation coefficient is greater than 0.500. The variance inflation (VIF) scores for all variables are below 4 in audit and non-audit fee models, consistent with no significant impact of collinearity among the variables on the results (Neter and Waserman, 1990 
. R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s
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We also find significant audit fee increases that coincide with the transition to and adoption of NZ IFRS.
Our audit fee model reflects these as positive and significant coefficients for PREIFRS, IFRSY1 and IFRSY2&3. For example, the coefficient for PREIFRS (0.307) indicates that the mean LAF in the year of transition is significantly higher than the mean LAF in the years prior to the transition year (the base group, denoted NONIFRS in the following discussion) for the IFRS adopters. Likewise, the coefficient estimates for IFRSY1 and IFRSY2&3 indicate that the mean LAF for the first year of IFRS adoption and the second/third year of adoption are 0.314 and 0.706 higher, respectively, than the mean LAF for the NONIFRS years.
We illustrate these numerical relationships using the estimated marginal means reported at the bottom of panel A.2 5F 22 The comparison of the estimated mean LAF provides further insight about the fee relationship 19 We also examined if any of the Big 4 earned higher audit fees than non-Big 4 by replacing the single Big 4 indicator with four individual Big 4 firm indicators and using the non-Big 4 as the base group. We find no evidence that any Big 4 firm charges premium fees compared to non-Big 4 firms, and we also observe no significant fee differences among the Big 4 firms. 20 We also followed a two-stage regression approach by first predicting non-audit fees and including the predicted value as an independent variable in the audit fee regression, similar to the approach adopted by Whisenant et al. (2003) and Antle et al. (2006) to correct for possible parameter bias that can result from using a single-stage approach. Our results, overall, are quantitatively similar except that coefficients for YR2003, YR2004, and YR2005 in the audit fee model are no longer significant. However this predicted variable is highly correlated with LTA, BIG4, and DA, and the VIF tolerance levels between these variables exceed acceptable thresholds (30.5, 23.5 and 87.3 respectively). We find a similar problem when we include predicted log of audit fee to estimate the NAF model. 21 Since debt is an example of a financial instrument, we interacted DA with all three IFRS variables to test if the complexity of NZ IAS 39 (Financial Instruments) corresponded with an increase in audit fees. Our result (unreported) shows that none of the interaction coefficients is statistically significant.
among the IFRS indicators. For example, we observe no significant fee increases from the year of transition to the first year of adoption (the means of LAF for PREIFRS and IFRSY1 are 11.396 and 11.403 respectively).
However, the mean LAF is significantly higher for the second and third years of IFRS adoption (mean LAF for IFRSY2&3 is 11.795) compared to the LAF in the first year of adoption (IFRSY1). In other words, our results suggest that NZ IFRS adopters incurred higher audit fees in their subsequent years of IFRS adoption (second or third year) than in the first or transition year.
Overall, these results support our expectation that companies began their transition to NZ IFRS in the year prior to the adoption, as reflected in a higher audit fee in the transitional period. Audit fees are also higher in the later years of IFRS adoption than the first year of adoption, consistent with an ongoing cost of IFRS. As such, the move to NZ IFRS has coincided with higher audit fees for New Zealand companies in all years The results for companies with Big 4 auditors (regression 2) and smaller New Zealand companies (regression 4) are qualitatively equivalent to those for the combined sample. None of the coefficients for the year indicators and the IFRS variables is significant for the non-Big 4 sample (not reported). Our results also imply that the audit fee increases in the later years for larger firms (regression 3) associate mostly with the transition to and implementation of NZ IFRS rather than more general factors, since none of the coefficients for YR2005, YR2006, and YR2007 is significant after we control for IFRS. 
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In short, we find no evidence of significant non-audit fee increases in the year prior to the IFRS adoption, year of the adoption, and subsequent years. While this is inconsistent with our expectation that auditors may have provided consulting services to audit clients regarding the move to IFRS, it is, on the other hand, broadly supportive of the contention that the stricter rules for auditor independence may have impacted non-audit fees.
Indeed, the results for the year indicators show that New Zealand auditors (especially the Big 4) reduced their provision of non-audit services to their audit clients, as the YR2005, YR2006, and YR2007 coefficients in panel B are significantly negative at less than one percent. Also, if we focus on the YR2003 and YR2004 coefficients, 23 We also performed an analysis of an alternative to model 2, which partitions the study period into two sub-periods and includes a year it is clear that SOX and similar legislation, at least initially, had little impact on New Zealand non-audit fees. 24 We tested if New Zealand companies with a dual-listing in Australia (13 companies) paid incremental higher audit fees and lower non-audit fees after the passage of CLERP 9 by including an interaction variable DUAL x YR2005-2007 in the audit and non-audit fee models, respectively. Our results show that the coefficients for the interaction variable are insignificant in either the audit or non-audit fee model, which suggests that those companies do not appear to experience incrementally higher audit fees or lower non-audit fees in [2005] [2006] [2007] . 25 We also estimated our audit and non-audit fee models excluding the companies in the finance industry (60 company-year observations) and obtained similar results as shown in table 3. Overall, the coefficients for PREIFRS, IFRSY1, and IFRSY2&3 are statistically positive with a slightly higher significance for IFRSY2&3 in the audit fee model. The coefficients for the three IFRS variables are also positive and significant in the non-audit fee model. 
R o b u s t n e s s t e s t s
. 1 E v e n t Y e a r A n a l y s i s o f I F R S
Rather than estimate the effects of NZ IFRS in calendar time, as we report in the previous section, an alternative approach estimates the impact of NZ IFRS in event time and, thus, exploits the fact that the initial year of adoption for the companies in our sample could be 2005, 2006, or 2007 . Such an approach does not rely on calendar estimates and may reduce calendar year dependence by combining the observations of different years. We define event year 0 as the adoption year. Event year -1 is therefore the year prior to adoption, or the year of transition.
To implement this approach, we first estimate the residuals from the audit fee model (model 1) each year without PREIFRS, IFRSY1, IFRSY2&3, and YR200X. The companies are divided according to which event year they belong to relative to IFRS adoption date. We then estimate the mean and median audit fee residual in adoption event years -2 to 2 and compare these data to the mean and median audit fee residual for companies
that have yet to adopt IFRS, although by the mechanics of regression estimation such mean of the residuals for non-adopting companies should be near zero. We calculate the individual year t-tests relative to a mean of zero. The residuals for "other years" (all observations other than the IFRS observations) are also tested relative to a mean of zero. Table 4 
. 2 I n d i v i d u a l Y e a r A n a l y s i s
The analysis in table 3 uses a pooled cross-sectional sample to test the impact of NZ IFRS on audit fees.
As there is a potential problem of lack of independence of observations for a constant sample, we examine the experience higher audit fees for the year prior to IFRS adoption, the year of adoption, and subsequent years. In particular, the fee increases are more significant in the year prior to the adoption and the subsequent years than the year of adoption. Finally, we observe that companies adopting in 2007 appear to have significantly higher audit fees in the year prior to adoption or upon adoption. We suspect this is because auditors reduce audit costs as they become more familiar with the IFRS implementation. Overall, the results for the individual year analysis are qualitatively equivalent to those for the pooled regressions.
. 3 I F R S P a g e L e n g t h A n a l y s i s
Our previous regression results document that audit fees increased following NZ IFRS. As a further test This study represents an initial attempt to explain whether the audit and non-audit fee changes in New
Zealand reflect overseas or local reforms. Using a pooled regression and an event study approach, we exploit the timing difference of these initiatives and their potential impact on fees to conclude that more explanatory power can be attributed to the governance and reporting changes that directly affect New Zealand companies, particularly the impact of the adoption of NZ IFRS, rather than generally non-binding initiatives such as SOX or CLERP 9 from other countries. These findings, however, represent only a statistical association between changes in audit fees and the events of interest, and as such our results are not dispositive of a directional or causal relation.
Finally, while our results are robust to different definitions and methodologies, additional work is warranted, especially if we wish to make more compelling statements about the relations we observe. For example, it would be helpful to know if the reduction in non-audit fees from audit clients is offset by an increase in consulting fees from companies that are not audit clients. It would also be interesting to learn in more detail about how individual boards and auditors make actual decisions to enhance audit fees and/or restrict non-audit fees paid to the auditor. Finally, future work could use longer series to query whether the 27 Another way to examine the relation of SOX to New Zealand audit fees would be to test if New Zealand companies with dual listings on a U.S. stock exchange have higher fees than those without a dual listing. Unfortunately, the small number of New Zealand companies with U.S. dual listings renders such a test unreliable.
higher fees from IFRS as documented in this study represent a shorter-term learning adjustment or a more permanent condition. Definitions of the italicized variables in panels D and E: LAF = Natural log of audit fee. LNAF = Natural log of non-audit fee. LTA = Natural log of total assets at end of fiscal year. INVAR = Ratio of sum of inventory and receivables to total assets. DA = Ratio of long-term debt to total assets. CURRENT = Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. ROA = Ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets. LAG = Natural log of audit lag (the number of days between the balance date and the auditor signature date). 
